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  T E X A S T A X  L A W Y E R  – SPR I NG  2011 
 
 
NONPR OF I T  E X E C UT I V E  C OM PE NSA T I ON 
 




I. Introduction.  Excessive compensation paid to nonprofit executives and board members 
is one of the key issues concerning charitable organizations that garner the attention of the 
general public and Congress. Charitable organizations may pay reasonable compensation to their 
directors, executive officers and employees for their services without violating applicable federal 
tax law or state law.  The determination of reasonable compensation depends on several factors – 
the budget of the organization being the most significant factor.  Other factors include the 
number of employees of the organization, the particular sector of the charitable community 
served by the organization, the geographic location of the organization, the focus of the 
organization as being national or local, the length of the employee’s service and external market 
forces. 
 
 Even if executive compensation is considered reasonable in light of the foregoing factors, 
the perception that a charitable organization is paying excessive compensation can be damaging 
to the organization’s reputation.  Some nonprofit executive salaries have reached seven figures, 
particularly in the larger health care systems and higher education.2
 
  In some cases, the highest 
paid employee of a charitable organization is not its chief executive officer, but instead may be a 
senior administrator or key physician of a large urban medical center, a key athletic coach at a 
Division I university, or a chief investment officer of a university or foundation with a large 
endowment.  Reports of high nonprofit executive compensation have lead the Internal Revenue 
Service to conduct an Executive Compensation Compliance Initiative in 2004 (with its findings 
published in March 2007, discussed below), and the Internal Revenue Service continues to 
scrutinize nonprofit executive compensation.  In addition, because nonprofit executive 
compensation must be reported annually on the organization’s Form 990, the general public, the 
media, and charity watchdog organizations also scrutinize nonprofit executive compensation.  
Therefore, it is important for charitable organizations not only to understand the federal tax law 
governing the payment of reasonable compensation to their directors, officers and key 
employees, but also to understand their reporting obligations and best practices with respect to 
executive compensation to avoid undue scrutiny.  
II. Prohibition on Private Inurement.  Section 501(c)(3) of the Code3 provides that no part 
of the net earnings of an organization described therein may inure to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual.  The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that any element of 
private inurement can cause an organization to lose or be deprived of tax exemption, and that 
there is no de minimus exception.4  The private inurement prohibition contemplates a transaction 
between a charitable organization and an individual in the nature of an “insider,” who is able to 
cause application of the organization’s assets for private purposes because of his or her position.5  
In general, an organization’s directors, officers, members, founders and substantial contributors 
are insiders.  The meaning of the term “net earnings” in the private inurement context has been 
largely framed by the courts.  Most decisions reflect a pragmatic approach, rather than a literal 
construction of the phrase “net earnings.”6  Common transactions that may involve private 
inurement include (i) excessive compensation for services; (ii) inflated or unreasonable rental 
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prices; (iii) certain loan arrangements involving the assets of a charitable organization; (iv) 
purchases of assets for more than fair market value; and (v) certain joint ventures with 
commercial entities.   
 
 A. Public Charities.  In general, a charitable organization is presumed to be a private 
foundation unless it can establish that it qualifies as a public charity under Sections 509(a)(1)–(3) 
of the Code.  Types of public charities described under Section 509(a)(1) of the Code include 
churches, schools, hospitals, government entities and university endowment funds.7  In addition, 
an organization which normally receives more than one-third of its total support from 
contributions from the general public is considered a public charity under Section 509(a)(1) of 
the Code.8
 
  An organization which receives more than one-third of its total support from exempt 
function revenues, such as admission fees to a museum or patient revenues for a hospital, is 
considered a public charity under Section 509(a)(2) of the Code, provided the organization does 
not normally receive more than one-third of its support from gross investment income.  An 
organization which does not meet either of these tests may still qualify as a public charity under 
Section 509(a)(3) of the Code as a “supporting organization” of another public charity by virtue 
of the relationship between the first organization and the second public charity.   
 B. Excess Benefit Transactions.  Section 4958 of the Code imposes an excise tax on 
disqualified persons who engage in excess benefit transactions with public charities.9  An 
“excess benefit transaction” is any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by the 
public charity directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person, if the value of the 
economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of 
services) received in exchange for such benefit.10
 
  The term “transaction” is used very generally 
and includes a disqualified person’s use of a charitable organization’s property and services 
provided to a disqualified person without adequate payment.  Prototypical examples of excess 
benefit transactions include paying excessive compensation to a director or officer or overpaying 
a director or officer for property the director or officer sells to the charitable organization.  
However, any direct or indirect benefit to a disqualified person may result in a violation of 
Section 4958 if the disqualified person does not provide adequate consideration for the benefit.  
 When it applies, Section 4958 imposes an initial tax equal to 25% of the excess benefit 
on any disqualified person.11  A tax of 10% of the excess benefit is imposed on any organization 
manager, i.e., any officer, director, or trustee of the organization, who knowingly participates in 
the transaction.12  The initial excise tax on organization managers is capped at $20,000.13 If a 
disqualified person engages in an excess benefit transaction with a public charity, corrective 
action must be taken to essentially undo the excess benefit to the extent possible and to take any 
additional measures to put the public charity in a financial position not worse than that in which 
it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards.14
 
 
 C. Disqualified Persons.  The term “disqualified person” includes any person who 
was, at any time during the 5-year period ending on the date of the transaction, in a position to 
exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.15  Some persons, including 
(but not limited to) board members, the president or chief executive officer, the treasurer or chief 
financial officer, family members of such individuals, and entities in which such individuals own 
35% of the interests, are automatically considered “disqualified.”16   
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 Where a person is not automatically disqualified, all of the facts and circumstances will 
generally be considered to determine if the person has substantial influence over the affairs of the 
organization.17
 
  Factors tending to show that an individual exercises substantial influence 
include:  
 i. the individual is a founder of the organization; 
 
 ii. the individual is a substantial contributor to the organization; 
 
 iii. the individual’s compensation is primarily based on revenues derived from 
activities of the organization, or of a particular department or function of the 
organization, that the individual controls; 
 
 iv. the individual has or shares authority to control or determine a substantial portion 
of the organization’s capital expenditures, operating budget, or compensation for 
employees; 
 
 v. the individual manages a discrete segment or activity of the organization that 
represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the 
organization, as compared to the organization as a whole; or 
 
 vi. the individual owns a controlling interest (measured by either vote or value) in a 
corporation, partnership, or trust that is a disqualified person.18
 
 
 Factors tending to show that an individual does not exercise substantial influence include:  
 
 i. the individual has taken a bona fide vow of poverty as an employee, agent, or on 
behalf, of a religious organization; 
 
 ii. the individual is a contractor (such as an attorney, accountant, or investment 
manager or advisor) whose sole relationship to the organization is providing professional 
advice (without having decision-making authority) with respect to transactions from 
which the individual will not economically benefit either directly or indirectly (aside 
from customary fees received for the professional advice rendered); 
 
 iii. the direct supervisor of the individual is not a disqualified person; 
 
 iv. the individual does not participate in any management decisions affecting the 
organization as a whole or a discrete segment or activity of the organization that 
represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the 
organization, as compared to the organization as a whole; or 
 
 v. any preferential treatment the individual receives based on the size of that 
individual’s contribution is also offered to all other donors making a comparable 
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  1. Exception for Non-Highly Compensated Employees.  Nonetheless, an 
employee who does not receive economic benefits from the organization in excess of the indexed 
amount for being considered a highly compensated employee ($110,000 in 2011),20 is not a 
disqualified person even if the above factors indicate that the individual may have substantial 
influence over the affairs of the organization.21  This exception does not apply to employees who 




  2. Initial Contract Exception.  The theory behind the initial contract 
exception is that an individual who negotiates an employment agreement in good faith before the 
individual is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the organization should not be 
subject to sanctions even if the compensation under the employment agreement turns out to be 
excessive.  Accordingly, Section 4958 does not apply to any fixed payment made to an 
individual with respect to an initial contract, regardless of whether the payment would otherwise 
constitute an excess benefit.23  An “initial contract” is a binding written agreement between the 
charitable organization and an individual who was not a disqualified person immediately before 
entering into the agreement.24 A “fixed payment” an amount of cash or other property specified 
in the agreement, or determined by a specified objective fixed formula, which is to be paid or 
transferred in exchange for the provision of specified services or property.25 A fixed formula 
may incorporate an amount that depends on future specified events or contingencies (such as the 
amount of revenues generated by one or more activities of the organization), provided that no 
person exercises discretion when calculating the amount of a payment or deciding whether to 
make a payment.26  If an initial contract provides for both fixed and non-fixed payments, the 
fixed payments will not be subject to Section 4958 while the non-fixed payments will be 
evaluated under an excess benefit transaction analysis, taking into account the individual’s entire 
compensation package.27
 
   
 D. What Constitutes Compensation?  A disqualified person’s entire compensation 
package must be evaluated to determine whether on the whole, the compensation received by the 
individual is reasonable for the services provided.  Accordingly, if the organization is relying on 
the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness (discussed below), the organization’s board of 
directors must consider and approve the disqualified person’s entire compensation package, not 
merely salary and bonuses.  The compensation package includes all forms of cash and noncash 
compensation, all forms of deferred compensation if earned and vested, most fringe benefits 
whether or not taxable, employer-paid premiums for liability insurance coverage,28 expense 
allowances and reimbursements, and other economic benefits received by the disqualified person 
from the organization in exchange for the performance of services.29  However, the following 
benefits may be disregarded in evaluating the compensation package under Section 4958: (i)  
employee fringe benefits that are excluded from gross income under Section 132; (ii)  expense 
reimbursements paid pursuant to an accountable plan; (iii) economic benefits provided to a 
disqualified person solely as a member of or volunteer for the organization if the same benefit is 
available to the general public in exchange for a membership fee of no more than $75 per year; 
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and (iv) economic benefits provided to a disqualified person solely as a member of a charitable 
class that the organization is organized to serve.30
 
   
  1. Determination of Reasonable Compensation.  In general, the value of 
services is the amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises (whether 
taxable or tax-exempt) under like circumstances (i.e., reasonable compensation).  Section 162 
standards apply in determining reasonableness of compensation, taking into account the 
aggregate benefits (other than any benefits specifically disregarded under Treasury Regulation 
Section 53.4958-4(a)(4)) provided to a person and the rate at which any deferred compensation 
accrues.31 The factors generally considered for purposes of Section 162 include (i) the 
employee’s qualifications, (ii) the nature, extent and scope of the employee’s work, (iii) the size 
and complexities of the employer’s business, (iv)  the prevailing economic conditions, (v) the 
prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable employers, and (vi) the 
employer’s salary policy that applies to all employees.32  The fact that bonus or revenue-sharing 
arrangement is subject to a cap is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of 
compensation. The fact that a state or local legislative or agency body or court has authorized or 
approved a particular compensation package paid to a disqualified person is not determinative of 
the reasonableness of compensation for purposes of Section 4958.33
 
 
  Normally, the facts and circumstances to be taken into consideration in 
determining reasonableness of a fixed payment are those existing on the date the parties enter 
into the agreement pursuant to which the payment is made.34  However, in the event of 
substantial non-performance, reasonableness is determined based on all facts and circumstances, 
up to and including circumstances as of the date of payment. In the case of any payment that is 
not a fixed payment under an agreement, reasonableness is determined based on all facts and 
circumstances, up to and including circumstances as of the date of payment.35
 
 
  2. Substantiation of Economic Benefit Treated as Compensation.  To monitor 
disguised compensation, the Treasury Regulations require a charitable organization to clearly 
indicate its intent to treat an economic benefit as compensation when it is paid.  This rule is 
intended to prevent a charitable organization from later claiming that an excess benefit 
transaction, such as a below-market loan or personal expense allowance, was actually 
compensation and that the overall compensation package of the disqualified person was 
reasonable.36 To establish its intent, the organization must provide contemporaneous written 
substantiation of the economic benefit intended to be compensation for services.37  
Contemporaneous written substantiation can be accomplished through the inclusion of the 
economic benefit on the individual’s Form W-2 or Form 1099, through a written employment 
agreement, or through the written contemporaneous documentation of the approved 
compensation package under the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.38  However, the 
organization is not required to provide written substantiation of its intent to include nontaxable 
economic benefits, such as employer-provided medical insurance or employer contributions to a 
qualified retirement plan, as part of the individual’s compensation.39
 
  As a result, even though 
contributions to qualified retirement plans and other nontaxable benefits are required to be taken 
into account in evaluating whether the overall compensation package is reasonable, they are not 
subject to the contemporaneous written substantiation requirement.  
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  3. Revenue-sharing Compensation Arrangements.  Revenue-sharing 
arrangements between a charitable organization and a disqualified person may be treated as an 
excess benefit transaction if the transaction results in prohibited private inurement.40
 
  The scope 
of this rule is uncertain and is not addressed in the final regulations.  However, the implications 
of this rule may be significant for performance-based compensation arrangements and more 
complex arrangements to share revenue from intellectual property or other income-producing 
activities.   
  After the enactment of Section 4958, proposed regulations were issued that 
addressed the application of the excess benefit transaction rules to revenue-sharing compensation 
arrangements.  These rules were not incorporated into the final regulations, and the Internal 
Revenue Service may later issue guidance in this area.  In the meantime, revenue-sharing 
compensation arrangements are evaluated under the general rules governing reasonableness of 
compensation paid to a disqualified person, leaving a fog of uncertainty about whether these 
arrangements are in fact reasonable. 
 
  Since the old proposed regulations provide the only guidance on this issue, they 
are discussed herein for informational purposes, although they have no precedential value.  In 
general, whether a revenue-sharing arrangement constitutes an excess benefit transaction 
depends on all relevant facts and circumstances.  The arrangement may result in excess benefit if 
it permits a disqualified person to receive additional compensation without providing 
proportional benefits for the charitable organization.  Relevant factors include the relationship 
between the size of the benefit provided and the quality and quantity of the services provided, 
and the ability of the disqualified person to control the activities generating the revenues.41  The 
proposed regulations provided three examples illustrating the principles for determining whether 
a revenue-sharing transaction resulted in an excess benefit:42
 
 
  i. In the first example, the disqualified person was an in-house investment 
manager for the charitable organization.  In addition to the individual’s regular salary and 
benefits, the individual was entitled to a bonus equal to a percentage of any increase in the net 
value of the portfolio.  The bonus was considered an incentive to maximize benefits and 
minimize expenses to the organization.  Thus, even though the individual had a measure of 
control over the portfolio performance, the bonus produced a proportional benefit for the 
organization.  Therefore, the revenue-sharing arrangement was not considered an excess benefit 
transaction. 
 
  ii. In the second example, the disqualified person was a third-party 
management company managing the charitable organization’s charitable gaming activities.  The 
management company controlled all of the activities generating revenues and paid the charitable 
organization a percentage of the net profits from these activities.  Since the management 
company provided all the personnel and equipment for the activities, the management company 
controlled all the costs charged to revenues and net revenues.  This structure did not provide the 
management company with an appropriate incentive to maximize benefits and minimize costs to 
the charitable organizations because the management company benefitted whether the net 
revenues were low because expenses were high or net revenues were high because expenses 
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were low.  In contrast, the charitable organization only benefitted if the net revenues were high.  
As a result, the entire transaction was considered an excess benefit transaction. 
 
  iii. In the third example, the disqualified person was a university professor 
who was the principal investigator in charge of certain scientific research.  In addition to the 
professor’s regular salary and benefits, the professor was entitled to a specified percentage of any 
patent royalties on inventions produced by the professor’s research.  This arrangement provided 
an incentive for the professor to produce especially high quality work and no incentive to act 
contrary to the university’s interest.  Moreover, the university shared proportionately with the 
professor.  Lastly, the university owned and controlled the patent and the professor had no 
control over the revenues generated from the patent.  This arrangement was not considered an 
excess benefit transaction.  Many research institutions have invention and research policies 
similar to this example. 
 
 E. Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness.  The Treasury Regulations provide 
for a procedure, which if followed, creates a rebuttable presumption that a transaction between a 
public charity and a disqualified person will not constitute an excess benefit transaction within 
the meaning of Section 4958 of the Code.  These procedures apply to fixed payments and, with 
minor additional requirements, to non-fixed payments subject to a cap.43  Legislative history 
indicates that compensation arrangement or other financial transactions will be presumed to be 
reasonable if the transaction arrangement was approved in advance by an independent board (or 
an independent committee of the board) that was composed entirely of individuals unrelated to 
and not subject to the control of the disqualified person, obtained and relied upon appropriate 
data as to comparability, and adequately documented the basis for its determination.44  The 
Treasury Regulations read into the legislative history three distinct requirements: (1) approval by 
an authorized body, (2) the appropriate data as to comparability, and (3) the documentation.45
 
 
  1. Approval by an Authorized Body.  The authorized body may be the Board 
of Directors or a committee duly authorized under state law to act on behalf of the Board of 
Directors.46  A person is not considered part of the authorized body if he merely meets to provide 
information to the board and then recuses himself.47  No person voting on the matter may have a 
conflict of interest with respect to the transaction.48
 
  A member of the authorized body does not 
have a conflict of interest if the member: 
    i. is not the disqualified person or related to any disqualified person 
who benefits from the transaction; 
 
    ii. is not employed by or controlled by any disqualified person 
benefiting from the transaction; 
 
    iii. is not receiving compensation or other payments from a 
disqualified person benefiting from the transaction; 
 
    iv. has no material financial interest affected by the compensation 
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    v. does not approve a transaction providing economic benefits to any 
disqualified person participating in the compensation arrangement or transaction, who 




  2. Appropriate Data as to Comparability
 
.  The authorized body must have 
sufficient information to determine whether a compensation arrangement or other transaction 
will result in the payment of reasonable compensation or a transaction for fair value.  Relevant 
information includes, but is not limited to: 
    i. compensation levels paid by other similarly-situated organizations 
(taxable or tax-exempt); 
 
    ii. availability of similar services in the applicable geographic area; 
 
    iii. independent compensation surveys; 
 
    iv.  written offers from similar institutions competing for the services 
of the person; 
 
    v. independent appraisals of all property to be transferred; or 
 




  3. Documentation
 
.  For the decision to be adequately documented, the 
records of the authorized body must note: 
    i. the terms of the transaction and the date it was approved; 
 
    ii. the members of the authorized body who were present during the 
debate on the transaction or arrangement and those who voted on it; 
 
    iii. the comparability data obtained and relied upon and how the data 
was obtained; 
 
    iv. the actions taken with respect to consideration of the transaction by 
anyone who is otherwise a member of the authorized body but who had a conflict of 
interest with respect to the transaction; and 
 




  Moreover, such records must be prepared by the next meeting of the authorized 
body (or within 60 days after the final action of the authorized body, if later than the next 
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meeting) and must be reviewed and approved as reasonable, accurate and complete within a 
reasonable time period thereafter.52
 
   
III. Best Practices for Executive Compensation. 
 
 A. Internal Revenue Service Executive Compensation Compliance Initiative.  The 
Internal Revenue Service has devoted substantial time and attention to executive compensation 
paid by nonprofit organizations.  In August 2004, the Internal Revenue Service announced that it 
would conduct a Compensation Compliance Initiative aimed at identifying and stopping abuses 
by nonprofit organizations that pay excessive compensation to their directors, officers and key 
employees.  The Compensation Compliance Initiative involved Internal Revenue Service contact 
of over 1,800 public charities and private foundations, seeking information about their 
compensation practices and procedures.  In March 2007, the Internal Revenue Service issued a 
report summarizing the results of its Compensation Compliance Initiative.53
 
  In its report, the 
Internal Revenue Service made the following points: 
  1. There were significant reporting issues with respect to executive 
compensation.  Over thirty percent of the organizations had to amend their Form 990 and 
approximately fifteen percent of the organizations were selected for examination. 
 
  2. Examinations primarily showed problems with reporting, rather than other 
concerns.  However, the Internal Revenue Service cautioned that this was not a statistical 
sample, so no definitive statement could be made about the level of compliance in the area of 
executive compensation.  The Internal Revenue Service will conduct continued work with 
respect to executive compensation. 
 
  3. Where problems were discovered, the Internal Revenue Service made 
large assessments of excise taxes with respect to excess compensation – 25 examinations of 
40 disqualified persons or organizations managers have resulted in proposed excise tax 
assessments in excess of $21 million. 
 
  4. While high compensation amounts were found in many cases, they 
generally were substantiated with appropriate comparability data. 
 
 Prior to the release of the final report on the Compensation Compliance Initiative, the 
Internal Revenue Service conducted an Executive Compensation Phone Forum in May 2006 to 
discuss the issues which emerged from the Compensation Compliance Initiative.54
 
  The Phone 
Forum provided an interesting view of the Internal Revenue Service’s thoughts on nonprofit 
executive compensation.  In particular, Internal Revenue Service representatives suggested that 
nonprofit organizations should focus their attention on the following best practices: 
 1. Legal Protection
 
.  According to the Internal Revenue Service representatives 
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 2. Timely Reporting and Disclosure
 
.  All economic benefits to directors, officers and 
key employees should be reported timely on the organization’s Form 990.  If an 
organization does not clearly indicate its intent to treat an economic benefit provided to an 
officer, director or key employee as compensation for services, it will automatically be 
treated as an excess benefit transaction.  Accordingly, organizations that fail to report 
“fringe benefit perks” like personal use of an automobile of reimbursement of personal 
expenses will subject the disqualified person to an automatic 25% excise tax on the amount 
of the fringe benefit as an automatic excess benefit transaction. 
 3. Transparency
 
.  While many charitable organizations have compensation 
committees that are given the authority to evaluate and approve executive compensation, the 
full board still has the ultimate responsibility over executive compensation matters.  
Therefore, to the extent appropriate, executive compensation matters decided by a 
committee of the board should be reported to the full board.  The level of oversight by the 
full board may vary depending on the type and size of the organization, but there should be 
a system in place to ensure that the full board is aware of the most important compensation 
matters within the organization.  The Internal Revenue Service representatives on the Phone 
Forum indicated there are specific problem areas that “frequently fall through the cracks.”  
In particular, personal components of business travel, personal use of employer-owned 
property, gifts and gift certificates, tax gross-ups, expense reimbursements outside corporate 
travel policies, spouse travel expenses, non-accountable expense allowances, and club 
memberships, are additional perks that some nonprofit executive receive and should be 
considered as part of the overall compensation package.  However, these items may not be 
disclosed to the board or the committee of the board making compensation determinations.   
 B. Panel on the Nonprofit Sector Recommendations.  Over the past several years, the 
Senate Finance Committee has scrutinized the compensation practices of charitable 
organizations.  While no legislation affecting compensation of nonprofit executives has been 
proposed, the staff of the Senate Finance Committee released a discussion draft on proposed 
reforms and best practices in the charitable community in June 2004 that may still be considered 
for future proposed legislation.55  At the prompting of the Senate Finance Committee, an 
independent nonprofit organization, the Independent Sector, convened the Panel on the 
Nonprofit Sector (the “Panel”) to study the proposals in the discussion draft and make 
recommendations with respect to the reforms needed in the charitable community.  The result 
was the issuance of the Panel’s final report “Strengthening Transparency Governance 
Accountability of Charitable Organizations” in June 2005.56  Most recently, the Panel issued a 
draft “Principles for Effective Practice,” which are a series of voluntary best practices standards 
for effective governance of charitable organizations.57
 
   
  1. Compensation of Individuals Serving the Organization in a Dual Capacity.  
Under current law, there is no prohibition on directors of a charitable organization receiving 
compensation from the organization for their services to the organization in some other capacity.  
However, the Senate Finance Committee staff discussion draft contained proposals that would 
limit the ability of a director of a charitable organization to receive compensation from the 
organization in some other capacity.  In particular, the proposals would allow only one member 
of the board to receive compensation from the organization, and such individual could not serve 
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as chair or treasurer of the organization.  Similarly, in its recommended “Principles for Effective 
Practice,” the Panel advocates separation of the paid chief executive officer and the treasurer and 
the chair of the charitable organization as an essential good governance practice.  The Panel’s 
rationale for this principle is as follows: 
 
Concentrating authority for the organization’s governance and management practices in 
one or two individuals removes valuable checks and balances that help ensure that 
conflicts of interest and other personal concerns do not take precedence over the best 
interests of the organization. Both the board chair and the treasurer should be independent 
of the chief staff executive to provide appropriate oversight of the executive’s 
performance and to make fair and impartial judgments about the appropriate 
compensation of the executive. When the board deems it is in the best interests of the 
charitable organization to have the chief executive officer/executive director serve as the 
board chair, the board should appoint another board member (sometimes referred to as 
the “lead director”) to handle issues that require a separation of duties. For example, the 
lead director would serve as chair for deliberations involving the responsibilities, 
performance or compensation of the chief executive officer/executive director. 
 
 In addition, the Panel advocates that a “substantial majority” of the directors of a 
charitable organization not be compensated for their services to the organization in any capacity 
other than as directors of the organization.  The Panel reasons “[w]hen a majority of the board 
members are free of the conflicts of interest that can arise from having a personal interest in the 
financial transactions of the charity, the board as a whole may be more likely to exercise its 
responsibility to review and take action on materials and information independent of the staff 
management.”  Accordingly, if a director of the charitable organization receives compensation 
for services to the organization in some other capacity, it is essential that the composition of the 
board be large enough so that the compensated individual does not unduly influence the board’s 
decisions.   
 
  2. Compensation of the Chief Executive Officer.  The Panel advocates that 
the board annually evaluate the performance of the chief executive officer prior to any change in 
that officer’s compensation, unless there is a multi-year contract in force or the change consists 
solely of routine cost of living adjustments.  The Panel considers the selection, evaluation and 
determination of compensation of the chief executive officer of the organization as one of the 
most important responsibilities of the board.  Accordingly, the Panel recommends that the full 
board approve the compensation of the chief executive officer annually.  Although delegation of 
chief executive officer compensation decisions to a compensation committee of the board is not 
recommended, the Panel provides that “[i]f the board designates a separate committee to review 
the compensation and performance of the CEO, that committee should be required to report its 
findings and recommendations to the full board for approval and should provide any board 
member with details, upon request. The board should then document the basis for its decision 
and be prepared to answer questions about it.”  Therefore, even though the rebuttable 
presumption of reasonableness would allow approval of the chief executive officer’s 
compensation by a duly authorized committee of the board, the Panel does not recommend that 
the final approval rest with a committee.  Even if a charitable organization does leave the 
approval of the chief executive officer’s compensation to a duly authorized compensation 
 
12 
  T E X A S T A X  L A W Y E R  – SPR I NG  2011 
committee, the committee should report the basis for its approval to the full board in a timely 
manner. 
 
  3. Compensation of Other Officers and Key Employees
 
.  As for the 
compensation of other officers and key employees, the determination of the amount of 
compensation is normally delegated to the chief executive officer. However, the Panel 
recommends that the board approve “the compensation range of other persons in a position to 
exercise substantial control of the organization’s resources. It is the responsibility of the CEO to 
hire and set the compensation of other staff, consistent with reasonable compensation guidelines 
set by the board. If the CEO finds it necessary to offer compensation that equals or surpasses his 
or her own, in order to attract and retain certain highly qualified and experienced staff, the board 
should review the compensation package to ascertain that it does not provide an excess benefit.”  
IV. Special Rules Applicable to Supporting Organizations and Donor Advised Funds. 
 
 A. Supporting Organizations.  Organizations that support a public charity are 
allowed public charity status if they meet certain requirements.  These “supporting 
organizations” are grouped into three types:  (i) those that are “operated, supervised, or 
controlled by” the public charity they support (Type I); (ii) those that are “supervised or 
controlled in connection with” the public charity they support (Type II); and (iii) those that are 
“operated in connection with” the public charity they support (Type III).58  Type III supporting 
organizations are further divided into functionally integrated Type III supporting organizations 
and other Type III supporting organizations.  A functionally integrated Type III supporting 
organization59 is defined as a Type III supporting organization that is not required to make 
payments to the supported organizations due to the supporting organization’s activities being 




 Enacted on August 17, 2006, the Pension Protection Act of 200661 (the “PPA”) contains 
many reforms for supporting organizations and donor advised funds (discussed below).  In 
particular, if an individual or entity is a disqualified person with respect to a supporting 
organization, such individual or entity is automatically a disqualified person with respect to the 
supported organization(s) as well.62  Accordingly, transactions between such individual or entity 
and the supported organization must be analyzed under the excess benefit transaction rules of 
Section 4958 of the Code.  In addition, all types of supporting organizations are prohibited from 
making grants, loans, compensation or similar payments63 to a substantial contributor of the 
supporting organization or a person related to a substantial contributor.64  Similarly, all loans to 
disqualified persons of the supporting organization are prohibited.65
 
  The prohibitions do not 
apply if the substantial contributor or disqualified person is a public charity (other than another 
supporting organization).  If a prohibited payment is made, the substantial contributor is treated 
as a disqualified person and the entire amount of the payment is treated as an excess benefit 
transaction under Section 4958(c) of the Code. 
 B. Donor Advised Funds.  Donor advised funds are generally funds owned by a 
public charity in which a donor is able to make non-binding recommendations as to their 
management and investment.  The charity remains in control over the use of the funds and is free 
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to disregard the advice of the donor.  Because the donor is able to influence how the funds are 
used, there is concern that donor advised funds are being abused in various ways.  The PPA adds 
Sections 4966 and 4967 to the Code which is designed to improve the accountability of donor 
advised funds. 
 
  1. Definitions
 
.  Section 4966(d) of the Code contains four important 
definitions, including a statutory definition of donor advised funds: 
   a. Sponsoring Organization:  A Sponsoring Organization is any 




   b. Donor Advised Fund:  The term “donor advised fund” means a 
fund or account: (1) that is separately identified by reference to contributions of a donor or 
donors;67 (2) that is owned and controlled by a Sponsoring Organization; and (3) with respect to 
which a donor, or the donor’s designee has, or reasonably expects to have, advisory privileges68 
regarding the distribution or investment of any amounts held in the fund.69  However, the term 
“donor advised fund” does not include a fund or account from which grants to individuals for 
travel, study or similar purposes are made as long as (a) the donor’s advisory privileges are 
performed exclusively by such donor in his capacity as a member of a committee appointed by 
the Sponsoring Organization, (b) no combination of a donor and persons related to or appointed 
by such donor control such committee, and (c) all grants from such funds satisfy the 
requirements applicable to private foundations under Section 4945(g) with respect to grants 
made for travel, study or similar purposes.70  In addition, a fund which benefits a single 
identified organization or governmental entity is exempted from treatment as a Donor Advised 
Fund.71  Furthermore, the Secretary of the Treasury (the “Secretary”) may exempt from 
treatment as a Donor Advised Fund a fund which is advised by a committee not controlled by a 
donor, donor advisor or related persons or which is designed to benefit a single identified 
charitable purpose.  In Notice 2006-109, the Internal Revenue Service determined that employer-
sponsored disaster relief funds are excluded from treatment as Donor Advised Funds, provided 
certain requirements are met.72
 
 
   c. Fund Manager:  A Fund Manager is any officer, trustee, or director 
of a Sponsoring Organization and, with respect to a specific act or failure to act, the employees 




   d. Disqualified Supporting Organization:  A Disqualified Supporting 
Organization is (1) any Type III supporting organization that is not a functionally integrated 
Type III supporting organization, (2) any Type I, Type II or functionally integrated Type III 
supporting organization over which a donor or donor appointee who advises regarding 
distributions from a Donor Advised Fund to such organization has direct or indirect control, or 
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  2. Inappropriate Donor Benefits.  In order to combat abuses where donors are 
inappropriately benefiting from Donor Advised Fund assets, the PPA imposes several reforms.  
First, Section 4966 of the Code prohibits distributions from a Donor Advised Fund to 
individuals.  Second, donors, donor advisors, and investment advisors to Donor Advised Funds 
are automatically treated as disqualified persons with respect to the Sponsoring Organization for 
purposes of Section 4958(f) of the Code.75  Accordingly, transactions between these persons and 
the Sponsoring Organization are subject to the excess benefit transaction rules contained in 
Section 4958 of the Code.  In addition, the definition of “excess benefit transaction” is amended 
to include any grant, loan, compensation or similar payment76 from a Donor Advised Fund to a 
person who is a donor, donor advisor, or related person.77  The entire amount of any such grant, 
loan, compensation or similar payment is treated as an “excess benefit” subject to the tax, 
regardless of whether the terms of the payment are reasonable.  Finally, if a donor, donor 
advisor, or related person receives, directly or indirectly, a benefit as a result of a distribution 
from a Donor Advised Fund, and such benefit is more than incidental, Section 4967 of the Code 
would impose excise taxes of 125% of the more than incidental benefit78 on the donor or donor 
advisor who recommended the distribution and on the recipient of the benefit.79  An excise tax of 
10% of the more than incidental benefit is also imposed on Fund Managers who approved the 
distribution.80  There is no exception for Fund Managers acting not willfully and due to 
reasonable cause.  No tax will be imposed under Code Section 4967 if a tax has been imposed 
under Code Section 4958 with respect to the distribution.81
 
 
V. Reporting Compensation on Form 990 
 
 A. Key Thresholds and Definitions
 
.  Thresholds vary for purposes of reporting 
names and compensation on Form 990 as follows: 
  1. Director or Trustee
 
.  All voting directors and trustees of a charitable 
organization are reported on Form 990 without regard to compensation. 
  2. Officer
 
.  All officers of a charitable organization are reported without 
regard to compensation. 
  3. Key Employee
 
.  A key employee is reported on Form 990 only if the 
employee’s compensation exceeds $150,000 and the employee (a) has responsibilities, powers or 
influence over the organization similar to those of officers, directors or trustees, (b) manages a 
discrete segment or activity of the organization that represents at least 10% of the assets, income 
or expenses of the organization, or (c) has or shares authority to control or determine at least 
10% of the organization’s capital expenditures, operating budget or employee compensation. 
  4. Highest Compensated Employees
 
. An organization’s highest compensated 
employees include its other employees whose compensation exceeds $100,000.  Only the top 
five highest compensated employees are reported on Form 990. 
  5. ODTKEs
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  6. Family Member / Family Relationship
 
.  For purposes of Form 990 
reporting, a family member includes an individual’s spouse, ancestors, siblings (whole or half), 
children (natural or adopted), grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and spouses of siblings, 
children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren. 
 B. Part VI – Line 15; Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness
 
.  Line 15 of Part VI 
asks “[d]id the process for determining compensation of the CEO/Executive Director/top 
management official and other officers or key employees of the organization include a review 
and approval by independent persons, comparability data, and contemporaneous substantiation of 
the deliberation and decision?”  Essentially, the organization is asked to describe if and how it 
establishes a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for compensation paid to the listed 
individuals. Schedule O must include a description sufficient to evidence that the organization 
takes appropriate steps to avoid the payment of “excess benefits” that could be taxable to the 
recipient and managers under Section 4958 of the Code. A clue to the desired elements of the 
compensation determination process is found in Schedule J, Part 1, Line 3, which lists the 
following components: compensation committee, independent compensation consultant, Form 
990s of other organizations, written employment contracts, compensation surveys, and approval 
by the governing board or compensation committee. 
 C. Part VII – ODTKEs and Highest Compensated Employees
 
.  All compensation 
paid to ODTKEs and highly compensated employees must be reported in Part VII.  For purposes 
of Part VII, a person with any voting power at any time during the year, whether compensated or 
not, is considered a director or trustee and must be listed.  If the membership of the board 
changes during the year, there will be more directors listed than the number that served at any 
one time, and all of them will be listed as “current” members of the board per the Form 990 
instructions.  Officers include anyone with top administrative and financial duties without regard 
to designation or title.   
 One objective of the Form 990 redesign with respect to compensation reporting was to 
gain the ability to compare similar organizations with different tax years. Thus, compensation for 
all organizations is reported on a calendar year basis as reflected on Forms W-2 or 1099.  The 
following compensation must be reported for the individuals required to be listed in Part VII 
regardless of amount:  (i) salaries and bonuses; (ii) employer contributions to defined benefit 
retirement plans; (iii) tax deferred employer and employee contributions to qualified defined 
contribution retirement plans; (iv) increase in the actuarial value of a qualified or nonqualified 
defined benefit plan, whether or not the plan is funded, vested or subject to a substantial risk of 
forfeiture; (v) increase in the value of a deferred compensation plan, whether or not vested or 
paid to the employee; and (vi) the value of health benefits provided by the employer that are not 
reported as part of reportable compensation, such as health insurance premiums, medical 
reimbursement, flexible spending plan contributions, and the value of health coverage provided 
by an employer’s self-insured or self-funded health plan.  Other compensation, such as 
compensation from a related organization and other reportable employee benefits (e.g., 
automobile allowances, life insurance, tuition assistance, dependent care assistance, disability 
insurance and club dues), must be reported if it exceeds $10,000 per item.82
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 Reporting difficulties with Part VII stem primarily from payments made by affiliated 
organizations, outside management companies, and common paymasters, including how to 
obtain the proper information and what to report.  For example, Organization A serves as 
common paymaster for itself and Organization B, a related entity. Officer M works 75% of her 
time for A and 25% for B. One hundred percent of M’s compensation is reported on the returns 
for both organizations.  Thus, a person reading both organizations’ Forms 990 may conclude that 
Officer M received more compensation than was actually paid due to the requirement to report 
the same compensation on both returns.  The organizations can alleviate this misperception of 
excessive compensation by including a statement on Schedule O of both returns that describes 
the allocation of Officer M’s compensation between the two organizations and that explains the 
same compensation is required to be reported on both returns. 
 
 D. Schedule J – Compensation Information for Certain ODTKEs and Highest 
Compensated Employees
 
.  Schedule J requires an organization to report additional detailed 
information regarding the compensation paid to certain ODTKEs and highest compensated 
employees.  An organization is required to complete Schedule J if it meets any of the following 
requirements:  (i) the organization is required to list any former ODTKE or highest compensated 
employees in Part VII; (ii) the sum of reportable compensation and other compensation paid to 
any individual listed in Part VII exceeds $150,000; or (iii) the organization participated in an 
arrangement in which an unrelated organization paid compensation to one of its ODTKEs or 
highest compensated employees for services performed for the filing organization.  If an 
organization is required to file Schedule J, the organization only needs to report on Schedule J 
the individuals that satisfy one of the three threshold requirements; other ODTKEs and highest 
compensated employees are not required to be reported on Schedule J. 
 Part I contains questions regarding the organization’s executive compensation practices 
and policies.  Line 3 asks about the method for determining compensation for the organization’s 
chief executive officer.  Like line 15 in Part VI of the core form, the question seeks to determine 
if the organization is following the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness procedures in 
determining the CEO’s compensation.  All other questions in Part I relate to the organization’s 
compensation practices and policies with respect to all of its ODTKEs and highest compensated 
employees reported in Part VII, even if the details of the compensation paid to some of those 
individuals are not required to be reported on Schedule J.  Line 4 asks whether any of the 
reported individuals received a severance or change of control payment, participated in a 
supplemental nonqualified retirement plan, or participated in an equity-based compensation 
arrangement.  If so, the details of the arrangement must be described in Part III of Schedule J.  In 
particular, the Internal Revenue Service is likely to scrutinize severance payments and equity-
based compensation arrangements for potential excess benefit.  The Internal Revenue Service is 
suspicious of any compensation that does not have a fixed amount or value.  Therefore, lines 5, 
6, and 7 ask whether the organization has paid any non-fixed payments to or participates in 
revenue-sharing arrangements with its ODTKEs and highest compensated employees.  If so, the 
details of the arrangement must be reported in Part III of Schedule J. 
 
 E. Schedule L – Relationships.  This schedule should be considered hand-in hand 
with responses provided in the governance portion of Part VI of Form 990. The completion of 
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Schedule L is made more complicated by the fact that the four separate parts each have a 
different definition of the term “interested person.” 
 
Part I requires disclosure of impermissible excess benefits with disqualified persons, which 
are subject to the intermediate sanctions penalties under Section 4958 of the Code and required 
to be reported on Form 4720. Coordination of the information provided in Line 15 of Part VI and 
Lines 1-8 of Schedule J, Part I (relating to compensation), is prudent.  
 
Part II reports loans to or from interested persons that are outstanding at the end of the year, 
regardless of whether the loans constitute excess benefit transactions under Section 4958. Loans 
for this purpose include salary and other advances and receivables. Interested persons include 
current and former ODTKEs listed in Part VII, Section A, highest compensated employees, and 
disqualified persons as defined in Section 4958 of the Code.  Even though loans to or from 
interested persons may be permissible, the Internal Revenue Service, the Panel on the Nonprofit 
Sector and charity watchdog groups all view interested person loans with great skepticism. 
 
Part III reports grants or assistance benefiting interested persons. Interested persons for this 
purpose include current and former ODTKEs listed in Part VII, Section A, substantial 
contributors, and family members and 35% controlled entities of any of the foregoing. The 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE has stipulated that grants paid to an interested person who is 
a member of the charitable class which the grant is intended to benefit in furtherance of the 
organization’s exempt purpose, such as disaster relief or trauma counseling, need not be 
reported. Grants to enhance one’s literary, artistic or other skills are reportable. The names of 
interested person grantees receiving funding for study or travel or for achievement awards must 
be included. Schools that award scholarships are not required to identify interested persons who 
receive grants. 
 
Part IV identifies reportable business transactions for which payments were made between 
the organization and an interested person during the tax year. The definition of interested person 
is broad and includes current and former ODTKEs listed on Part VII, Section A, family members 
or 35% controlled entities of any ODTKEs, or an entity (other than an exempt organization 
described in Section 501(c) of the Code or a governmental unit or instrumentality) of which a 
current or former ODTKE listed in Form 990, Part VII, Section A was serving at the time of the 
transaction as (1) an officer, (2) a director, (3) a trustee, (4) a key employee, (5) a partner or 
member with a direct or indirect ownership interest in excess of 5% (including ownership by a 
family member) if the entity is treated as a partnership, or (6) a shareholder with a direct or 
indirect ownership interest in excess of 5% (including ownership by a family member) if the 
entity is a professional corporation. Business transactions include contracts of sale, lease, license, 
and performance of services and also joint ventures in which the interest of the organization and 
of the interested person each exceeds 10%. Business transactions with interested persons are 
reportable if: (1) all payments during the tax year between the organization and interested person 
exceeded $100,000, (2) all payments from a single transaction between the organization and 
interested person exceeded the greater of $10,000 or 1% of the organization’s total revenues, (3) 
compensation payments by the organization to a family member of certain persons exceeded 
$10,000, or (4) in the case of a joint venture with an interested person, the organization has 
invested $10,000 or more. 
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VI. Texas Law Related to Nonprofit Executive Compensation.  Texas law is similar to 
federal tax law regarding compensation of officers and directors of a nonprofit organization.  The 
Texas Nonprofit Corporation Law (TNCL) allows nonprofit corporations to “pay compensation 
in a reasonable amount to its . . . directors and officers for services rendered.”83
 
   
 A. Role of the Board of Directors.  Typically, Texas nonprofit corporations are 
managed by a board of directors (sometimes called the board of trustees).  Texas law requires a 
minimum of three directors of a nonprofit corporation.84  The board of directors is ultimately 
responsible for the oversight of the nonprofit corporation.  The board of directors elects the 




 B. Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors
 
.  The fiduciary standards applicable to 
charitable directors include the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the duty of obedience. 
  1. Duty of Care.  All nonprofit directors are subject to a duty of care.  The 
duty of care requires a nonprofit director to discharge his responsibilities in good faith, with the 
care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances, and in a manner the director reasonably believes is in the best interests of the 
organization.86  The degree of skill required is that of the ordinary prudent person, that is, the 
basic directorial attributes of common sense, practical wisdom, and informed judgment.  If a 
director has special expertise, such as accounting, legal or investment expertise, then that director 
must exercise the degree of skill that a prudent person with similar expertise would exercise in 
the same or similar circumstances.  The duty of care also requires that directors make decisions 
they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation.87
 
   
A director can fail to discharge the duty of care in two ways: by failing to supervise or by 
failing to make an informed decision.  Adequate supervision means that the director actively 
participates in the charity’s governance, such as by regularly attending board meetings, 
reviewing minutes and other materials disseminated to board members, meeting periodically 
with senior management, periodically reviewing the charity’s financial statements and annual 
information returns (IRS Form 990), and asking questions of outside experts such as consultants, 
accountants and attorneys when appropriate.  To make an informed decision, a director must be 
adequately informed about the material aspects of a proposed transaction before approving it.  In 
discharging the duty of care, a director may rely in good faith on information, opinions, reports 
or statements concerning the corporation that was prepared or presented by officers, employees, 
a committee of the board of which the director is not a member, or outside professional advisors 
to the corporation (e.g., auditors, legal advisors, and investment advisors).88
 
  Thus, directors 
should be aware of the compensation paid to the organization’s officers and the method used to 
determine the officers’ compensation.  If the director is serving on a compensation committee (or 
if approval of officer compensation is done by the entire board), then the director should review 
all relevant materials related to the compensation decision prior to the meeting and ask relevant 
questions of any compensation consultant retained by the organization. 
 
19 
  T E X A S T A X  L A W Y E R  – SPR I NG  2011 
The business judgment rule protects nonprofit directors by providing that directors will not 
be liable for harm to the corporation for the exercise of their judgment so long as they exercised 
care in the decision making process.  Thus more than simple negligence on the part of the 
director is required to hold the director liable for a breach of the duty of care.  The business 
judgment rule applies only in the absence of fraud, illegality or a disabling conflict of interest. In 
summary, the duty of care relates to the decision-making process.  If a nonprofit director acts in 
good faith and satisfies the requisite standard of care, a court generally will not review the action, 
even if it proves disastrous to the charity.  Accordingly, compliance with the duty of care 
protects a nonprofit director from liability for decisions that, with the benefit of hindsight, turn 
out to be wrong. 
 
  2. Duty of Loyalty.  To satisfy the duty of loyalty, a nonprofit director must 
act in the best interests of the corporation, but does not need to avoid personal gain at all costs.  
In the nonprofit corporate setting, a conflict-of-interest or self-dealing transaction is not flatly 
prohibited, but should be carefully scrutinized.  The only exception is a blanket prohibition on 
loans to directors of a nonprofit corporation; any director who votes for or assents to the making 
of the loan is jointly liable for the amount of the loan until it is repaid.89  Before engaging in a 
self-dealing or conflict-of-interest transaction with a charitable organization (including payment 
of compensation to the director in the director’s capacity as an officer of the organization), the 
director should disclose all material facts relating to his personal interest in the transaction to the 
board of directors or a committee of the board comprised of disinterested directors, and a 
majority of disinterested directors or committee members should approve the transaction only 
after concluding that it is fair and reasonable to the charity.90
 
  If this procedure is followed, then 
the transaction is not void or voidable solely because of the director’s interest in the transaction.  
If the transaction occurred prior to obtaining approval from a majority of disinterested directors, 
then the transaction may be ratified by a majority of disinterested directors or a committee of the 
board comprised of disinterested directors provided the transaction is fair to the nonprofit 
corporation.  A breach of the duty of loyalty not only gives rise to a tort claim under state law, 
but may also implicate penalties under federal tax law as an excess benefit transaction. 
  3. Duty of Obedience
 
.  The duty of obedience requires a director to adhere to 
the governing documents of the organization and to faithfully adhere to its mission, and to follow 
restrictions imposed by donors on contributions of charitable funds.  Essentially, the duty of 
obedience requires directors and trustees to refrain from transactions and activities that are ultra 
vires.  Thus, a director must carefully review the governing documents of the organization and 
adhere to any provisions in the governing documents addressing the compensation of the 
organization’s directors and officers. 
  4. Limitation of Liability.  Texas law allows for a nonprofit corporation to 
limit the liability of its directors to the organization or its members for monetary damages for an 
act or omission by the director in the person’s capacity as a director by including appropriate 
provisions in its certificate of formation.91  However, the elimination or limitation of the liability 
of a director is not allowed to the extent the person is found liable under applicable law for: (1)  a 
breach of the director’s duty of loyalty; (2)  an act or omission not in good faith that: (A)  
constitutes a breach of duty of the director to the organization; or (B)  involves intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (3)  a transaction from which the director received an 
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improper benefit, regardless of whether the benefit resulted from an action taken within the 
scope of the director’s duties; or (4)  an act or omission for which the liability of a director is 
expressly provided by an applicable statute.92
 
 
 C. Enforcement by the Texas Attorney General
 
.  Officers and directors who breach 
their fiduciary duties to the nonprofit corporation may be held liable to the nonprofit corporation 
for the resulting damages to the corporation.  Generally, the Texas Attorney General is vested 
with the authority to investigate and enforce potential breaches of fiduciary duties by nonprofit 
officers and directors.  While the enforcement of excessive compensation paid to nonprofit 
directors and officers in Texas by the Texas Attorney General is not common, it has been 
successfully done.   
 Most recently, the Texas Attorney General brought suit against several directors of the 
Carl B. and Florence E. King Foundation seeking to recover excessive compensation paid to the 
officers.93
 
  The King Foundation was established in 1966 by oilman Carl B. King and his wife, 
Florence E. King. The primary defendant in the case, Carl L. Yeckel, is the Kings’ grandson. 
Yeckel was elected to the King Foundation’s board of directors in 1971. At the time, Florence 
King was the board’s president. Thereafter, in 1975, Yeckel accepted full-time employment with 
the King Foundation for an annual salary of $24,000.  Yeckel was elected president of the King 
Foundation in 1993, after the death of both his grandparents. On October 6, 1994, during his first 
year as Foundation president, Yeckel sent a memorandum to the board proposing raises for 
himself and the King Foundation’s two other employees, Thomas Vett, the corporate secretary 
and accountant, and office staffer Carolyn Mott. In the memo, Yeckel advised the board that his 
annual salary as of that date was $220,800, that Vett’s salary was $120,700, and that Mott’s 
salary was $75,500. Yeckel proposed a four percent fixed salary increase for each employee plus 
“a possible merit scale of 0 - 4%,” effective as of June 1, 1994. Yeckel further stated that the 
King Foundation’s practice had been to increase or adjust salaries each April 1, and justified the 
raises he proposed as necessary to correct a “twenty month oversight” in making those annual 
adjustments. Yeckel’s memo prompted at least one of the King Foundation’s board members to 
raise concerns that the salary levels were high compared to comparable foundations--between 
seventeen and sixty-five percent higher, the board member claimed--and could create problems 
with the Internal Revenue Service. Similar concerns were raised by the accountant who prepared 
the King Foundation’s tax returns.  
 In the years that followed, Yeckel did not again disclose employee salaries to the King 
Foundation’s board, although this information was included in the Foundation’s annual tax 
returns. Yeckel was able to set his own compensation and that of Vett and Mott, without board 
approval.  He steadily increased his compensation during each year of his presidency between 
twenty and twenty-six percent each year from 1996 through 2000, while awarding Vett annual 
increases of between nineteen and twenty-two percent. By 2002, Yeckel’s annual salary was 
$974,978, Vett’s was $451,937, and Mott’s was $141,622, not counting benefits. In addition, a 
separate bank account was established from which the salaries of Yeckel and Vett were paid, and 
no one other than Yeckel and Vett saw the checks written on that account. Board members were 
unaware of the continued increases in Yeckel’s compensation after 1994 and of various benefits 
that Yeckel provided to himself using Foundation funds, including use of vehicles, private club 
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memberships, payment of all unreimbursed health expenses for himself and his family, and use 
of Foundation credit cards for personal charges that were not required to be reimbursed. 
 
 In August 2002, after receiving a complaint from Yeckel’s sister, the Texas Attorney 
General sued the King Foundation, Yeckel, Vett, and other directors to protect the public interest 
in the administration of charitable assets held by the King Foundation. The suit asserted claims 
against Yeckel, Vett and other officers and directors of the King Foundation for breach of 
fiduciary duty, conversion, conspiracy to commit fraud, and violation of the Texas Non-Profit 
Corporation Act. Subsequently, Yeckel resigned from the King Foundation, each of the other 
members of the five-member board either resigned or was removed, and Vett was terminated. 
With a new board of directors in control, the Texas Attorney General dropped its suit against the 
King Foundation, and the King Foundation asserted its own claims against Yeckel, the other 
former directors, and Vett, and was realigned as a co-plaintiff with the Texas Attorney General. 
Ultimately, settlements were reached with most of the other directors and a trial on the claims 
against Yeckel and Vett ensued.  The jury found Yeckel and Vett breached their fiduciary duties 
to the King Foundation and received excessive compensation for their services.  Yeckel was 
ordered to reimburse the King Foundation $5,286,946.76 and Vett was ordered to reimburse the 
King Foundation $2,304,629.49.  Additional punitive damages of $14 million awarded by the 
jury were not upheld on appeal.94
 
  The King Foundation case is representative of situations in 
which the failure of board members to properly exercise their duty of care by staying informed 
and properly supervising creates an environment ripe for abuse by self-interested officers and 
directors. 
 D. Proposed Legislation.  The Texas Legislature is currently considering legislation 
that would increase the enforcement power of the Texas Attorney General with respect to 
charitable organizations.  House Bill 292195
 
 would amend the Texas Business Organizations 
Code to provide:  
 If the attorney general has reason to believe that a nonprofit entity with a 
charitable purpose is engaging in, has engaged in, or is about to engage in an 
unlawful act or practice or that it would be in the public interest to conduct an 
investigation to ascertain whether the entity is engaging in, has engaged in, or is about 
to engage in an unlawful act or practice, the attorney general may: 
 
(1)  require an employee or agent of the entity to file on forms prescribed by the 
attorney general a statement or report in writing, under oath or otherwise, as to all the 
facts and circumstances concerning the alleged unlawful act or practice and other data 
and information the attorney general considers necessary; and 
 




 A similar amendment is proposed for the Texas Trust Code relating to charitable trusts.97  
House Bill 2921 was recently reported favorably out of the State Affairs Committee on April 19, 
2011 and may now be considered by the Texas House of Representatives.  A similar Senate Bill 
34298 is currently pending for Senate committee action. 
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Texas.  David M. Rosenberg is with the law firm of Thompson & Knight L.L.P. in Dallas, Texas. 
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(the Chronicle of Philanthropy’s annual survey lists the compensation and benefits paid to top executives of some 
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generally); The Chronicle of Higher Education 2010 Executive Compensation Survey, available at 
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(concluding that private inurement occurred when a hospital sold a facility to a private entity controlled by insiders 
for less than the fair market value).   
7  I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v).   
8  I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(vi); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(2).   
9  Private foundations are subject to a different excise tax regime on transactions with disqualified persons.  See 
I.R.C. § 4941.  Section 4941 of the Code prohibits direct or indirect acts of “self dealing” between a private 
foundation and those individuals or entities who are “disqualified persons” with respect to the foundation.  
Typically, in considering whether a transaction between a private foundation and a disqualified person is an act of 
self-dealing, it is immaterial whether the transaction results in a benefit or detriment to the foundation.  Treas. Reg. § 
53.4941(d)-1(a).  However, a private foundation generally may pay reasonable compensation to a disqualified 
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compensation to a disqualified person for services unrelated to carrying out the foundation’ s exempt purposes and 
the payment of excessive compensation (or payment or reimbursement of excessive expenses) by a private 
foundation to a disqualified person are prohibited acts of self-dealing.  I.R.C.§ 4941(d)(2)(E). 
10  I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1).   
11  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1).  
12  I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2).   
13  I.R.C. § 4958 (d)(2). 
14  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(6).  The Treasury Regulations contain specific procedures to correct certain excess benefit 
transactions between a public charity and a disqualified person.  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-7. 
15  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1).  
16  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c). 
17  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e). 
18  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(2). 
19  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(3). 
20  Notice 2010-78, 2010-49 I.R.B. 808 (Oct. 28, 2010).  Note that this is a different standard than the one used to 
determine which individuals are “highly-compensated employees” for Form 990 reporting purposes. 
21  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(d)(3). 
22  Id. 
23  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(i). 
24  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(iii). 
25  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii). 
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27  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(vi). 
28  A charitable organization’s payment of premiums for liability insurance covering Section 4958 excise taxes or 
indemnification of such taxes will not be an excess benefit if the premium or indemnification is included in the 
disqualified person’s compensation when paid and the disqualified person’s total compensation is reasonable.  
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(B)(2). 
29  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(B). 
30  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(4). 
31  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii). 
32  Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 115 (6th  Cir. 1949). 
33  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii). 
34 These general timing rules also apply to property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Therefore, if the 
property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture satisfies the definition of fixed payment, reasonableness is 
determined at the time the parties enter into the agreement providing for the transfer of the property.  Treas. Reg. § 
53.4958-4(b)(2)(i). 
35  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(2)(i). 
36  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(4) Example 2. 
37  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(1). 
38  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(3). 
39  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(2). 
40  I.R.C.  § 4958(c)(4). 
41  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(a) (withdrawn). 
42  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(d) (withdrawn). 
43  Non-fixed payments to a disqualified person not subject to a cap are generally not advisable.  The Internal 
Revenue Service will not presume any non-fixed payments to be reasonable until the amounts are determined.  
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(d).  Therefore uncapped non-fixed payments are highly vulnerable to challenges as excess 
benefit transactions or private inurement. 
44  H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56-57. 
45  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1)-(3).  
46  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i)(A)-(C).  
47  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii). 
48  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1).  
49  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(A)-(E). 
50 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i). For organizations with annual gross receipts of less than $1 million, the 
authorized body will be considered to have appropriate data as to comparability if it has compensation data of three 
comparable organizations in the same or similar communities for similar services.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii). 
51  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i)(A)-(D), (ii).   
52  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii). 
53  Report on Exempt Organizations Executive Compensation Compliance Project – Parts I and II (March 2007), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/exec_comp_final.pdf.  
54 The 18-page script from the Phone Forum is available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/may_17_final_script_exec_comp_phone_forum.pdf.  
55  In fact, many of the proposed reforms contained in the discussion draft found their way into the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 (the “PPA”), which was enacted in August 2006.  While compensation reforms were not 
contained in the PPA, then-serving Senate Finance Committee Chairman Grassley indicated that the PPA was only 
the first of proposed legislative reforms for the charitable community and that more should be expected. 
56  Available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/final/Index.html.   
57  Available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/principles/Principles_Guide.pdf.   
58  I.R.C. § 509(a)(3). 
59  Proposed regulations issued on September 24, 2009 provide an integral part test to determine whether a Type III 
supporting organization qualifies as a functionally integrated Type III supporting organization.  See Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(4).  A Type III supporting organization satisfies this integral part test if it either (1) serves as the 
parent of each of its supported organizations or (2) engages in activities (i) substantially all of which directly further 
the exempt purposes of its supported organizations, by performing the functions of, or carrying out the purposes of, 
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such supported organizations, and (ii) that, but for the involvement of the supporting organization, would normally 
be engaged in by its supported organizations.  Id. 
60  I.R.C. § 4943(f)(5)(B).  As the Joint Committee on Taxation explains: 
The current such regulation is Treasury regulation section 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(ii). Under Treasury 
regulation section 1.509(a)-4(i)(3), the integral part test of current law may be satisfied in one of two 
ways, one of which requires a payout of substantially all of an organization’s income to or for the use 
of one or more publicly supported organizations, and one of which does not require such a payout. 
There is concern that the current income-based payout does not result in a significant amount being 
paid to charity if assets held by a supporting organization produce little to no income, especially in 
relation to the value of the assets held by the organization, and as compared to amounts paid out by 
nonoperating private foundations. There also is concern that the current regulatory standards for 
satisfying the integral part test not by reason of a payout are not sufficiently stringent to ensure that 
there is a sufficient nexus between the supporting and supported organizations. In revising the 
regulations, the Secretary has the discretion to determine whether it is appropriate to impose a payout 
requirement on any or all organizations not currently required to pay out. It is intended that, in 
revisiting the current regulations, if the distinction between Type III supporting organizations that are 
required to pay out and those that are not required to pay out is retained, which may be appropriate, the 
Secretary nonetheless shall strengthen the standard for qualification as an organization that is not 
required to pay out. For example, as one requirement, the Secretary may consider whether substantially 
all of the activities of such an organization should be activities in direct furtherance of the functions or 
purposes of supported organizations. 
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 
2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3, 2006) at 360, n. 571. 
61  Pub. L. No. 109-280 (2006). 
62  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(D). 
63  The term “other similar payment” is not intended to include a payment pursuant to a bona fide sale or lease of 
property.  Such payments are instead subject to the general rules of Section 4958 if the substantial contributor meets 
the definition of a “disqualified person.”  Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of 
H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3, 2006) at 358. 
64  I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3). 
65  Id. 
66  I.R.C. § 4966(d)(1). 
67  A fund or account of a Sponsoring Organization which pools contributions of multiple donors generally will not 
meet the first prong of the definition of “donor advised fund” unless the contributions of specific donors are in some 
way tracked and accounted for within the fund.  Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical 
Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3, 2006) at 342-43. 
68  This requirement is satisfied only if the expectation of advisory privileges is by reason of the donor’s status as 
donor, and not solely by reason of the donor’s service to the Sponsoring Organization, such as by reason of the 
donor’s position as an officer, employee or director of the Sponsoring Organization.  Staff of the Joint Comm. on 
Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3, 
2006) at 344. 
69  I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2). 
70  I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(B)(ii). 
71  I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(B)(i). 
72  Notice 2006-109, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1121. 
73  I.R.C. § 4966(d)(3). 
74  I.R.C. § 4966(d)(4). 
75  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(D) and (E). 
76  The term “other similar payment” is not intended to include a payment pursuant to a bona fide sale or lease of 
property.  Such payments are instead subject to the general rules of Section 4958.  Staff of the Joint Comm. on 
Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3, 
2006) at 347. 
77  I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2). 
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78  Although there is no statutory definition of “incidental benefit,” the Joint Committee on Taxation’s interpretation 
of this provision states that there is only an incidental benefit if, as a result of a distribution from a Donor Advised 
Fund, a donor, donor advisor or related person, receives a benefit that would have reduced a charitable contribution 
deduction if the benefit was received as part of the contribution to the Sponsoring Organization.  Staff of the Joint 
Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 
(Aug. 3, 2006) at 350. 
79  I.R.C. § 4967(a)(1). 
80  I.R.C. § 4967(a)(2). 
81  I.R.C. § 4967(b). 
82  The $10,000 reporting threshold for other employee benefits and compensation paid by related organizations 
applies only to compensation reported in Part VII.  These items are also required to be reported on Schedule J, 
regardless of amount.  Accordingly, the amounts reported on Schedule J may exceed the amount of compensation 
reported in Part VII for the same person. 
83 Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.054. 
84 Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.204(a). 
85 See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.232(b). 
86 See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.221(a). 
87 See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.221. 
88 See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 3.102. 
89 See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.225.  In addition, loans to officers of a nonprofit corporation are prohibited unless 
the loan is “(1) made for the purposes of financing the officer’s principal residence; or (2) set in an original principal 
amount that does not exceed: (A) 100 percent of the officer’s annual salary, if the loan is made before the first 
anniversary of the officer’s employment; or (B) 50 percent of the officer’s annual salary, if the loan is made in any 
subsequent year.”  Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.055(b). 
90 See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.230.  Note that the procedure under Texas law for interested director transactions is 
not as stringent at the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness procedure for transactions with disqualified persons 
under Section 4958 of the Code. 
91 See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 7.001(b). 
92 See Tex. Bus. Org. Code §7.001(c). 
93 See Yeckel v. Abbott, No. 03-04-00713-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3881 (Tex. App. – Austin June 4, 2009, pet. 
denied) (mem. op.). 
94  Id. 
95  Tex. H.B. 2921, 82nd  Leg., R.S. (2011). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Tex. S.B. 342, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011). 
